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Consciousness, as described in the experimental literature, is a multi-faceted phenom-
enon, that impinges on other well-studied concepts such as attention and control. Do
consciousness and attention refer to different aspects of the same core phenomenon,
or do they correspond to distinct functions? One possibility to address this question is to
examine the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness and attention. If consciousness
and attention pertain to the same concept, they should rely on shared neural mechanisms.
Conversely, if their underlying mechanisms are distinct, then consciousness and attention
should be considered as distinct entities. This paper therefore reviews neurophysiological
facts arguing in favor or against a tight relationship between consciousness and attention.
Three neuralmechanisms that have been associatedwith both attention and consciousness
are examined (neural ampliﬁcation, involvement of the fronto-parietal network, and oscilla-
tory synchrony), to conclude that the commonalities between attention and consciousness
at the neural level may have been overestimated. Last but not least, experiments in which
both attention and consciousness were probed at the neural level point toward a dissocia-
tion between the two concepts. It therefore appears from this review that consciousness
and attention rely on distinct neural properties, although they can interact at the behavioral
level. It is proposed that a “cumulative inﬂuence model,” in which attention and conscious-
ness correspond to distinct neural mechanisms feeding a single decisional process leading
to behavior, ﬁts best with available neural and behavioral data. In this view, consciousness
should not be considered as a top-level executive function but should rather be deﬁned by
its experiential properties.
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INTRODUCTION
Attention and consciousness have traditionally been considered
as closely related. In 1890,William James famously wrote “Every-
one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focaliza-
tion, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence” (James,
1890).About a 100 years later, it was argued (Posner, 1994) that“an
understanding of consciousness must rest on an appreciation of
the brain networks that subserve attention.” In this view, attention
and consciousness reﬂect related concepts, much as temperature
and heat. The idea that attention acts as a gateway for conscious-
ness has been formalized in inﬂuential theories of consciousness
(Baars, 1997; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dennett, 2001): those
events that enter consciousness are those that have been selected
and ampliﬁed by attention.
Before examining whether this intuitive view on the intrinsic
link between attention and awareness ﬁts with experimental evi-
dence, it is worth reminding why it is important to uncover the
link between attention and consciousness. First, from a purely sci-
entiﬁc point of view, one cannot confuse intuition with evidence.
We do have the intuition that the sun revolves around the earth,
but this intuition proved to be incorrect in the face of scientiﬁc
evidence. It is therefore important to submit our intuition on
the intrinsic link between attention and consciousness to careful
experimental scrutiny and confront theories with facts. Second,
we still do not know whether consciousness has a function on its
own, whether it confers an evolutionary advantage (Block, 1995;
Chalmers, 1995). It is an important issue because it impinges on
the deﬁnition of consciousness. Is consciousness the natural com-
panion of all high-level cognitive functions? When consciousness
disappears, as in deep sleep or in vegetative state, cognition seems
to disappear as well. Besides, consciousness apparently shares lim-
ited capacities with attention and working memory. On the other
hand, consciousness could be characterized by its experiential
properties, rather than by its accompanying cognitive abilities
(Block, 2007). Probing the nature of the links between the cog-
nitive function “attention” and consciousness therefore taps right
into the debate on the deﬁnition of consciousness: if conscious-
ness is intrinsically related to attention, then its functional role
and evolutionary advantage should pertain to executive func-
tions. Alternatively if attention and consciousness are distinct,
then consciousness should no longer be considered as an executive
function, but be deﬁned by its experiential properties. Although
attention and consciousness are notoriously ill-deﬁned concepts,
some operational deﬁnitions are commonly accepted: attention is
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manipulated when a relevant aspect of the stimulus (i.e., location,
color, direction of motion, etc.) is speciﬁed beforehand to the sub-
ject, consciousness is measured when the subject reports seeing
or hearing something (note that I consider here mainly sensory
consciousness, leaving aside the issues of self-consciousness and
volition). I will rely on those operational deﬁnitions in the fol-
lowing of the paper, to analyze how neuroimaging results relying
on those deﬁnitions can shed light on the links between attention
and awareness, and, in turn, can help us to reﬁne the theoretical
deﬁnitions of those two concepts.
There are many different ways the links between attention and
consciousness can be studied. Numerous behavioral ﬁndings, not
extensively reviewed here, suggest a strong link: attention can facil-
itate detection (Solomon, 2004) and alter the subjective appear-
ance of stimuli (Carrasco et al., 2004). Conversely, in the absence
of attention, salient stimuli may not be reported by the subjects, as
in inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998), change blind-
ness (Simons and Levin, 1997), or during the attentional blink
(Shapiro et al., 1997). However a growing number of elegant
behavioral manipulations in patients (Kentridge et al., 1999, 2004)
and normal participants (Sumner et al., 2006; Kentridge et al.,
2008; Van Boxtel et al., 2010b; Faivre and Kouider, 2011) show
that attention and consciousness can sometimes be distinguished,
within a disputed theoretical framework (Lamme, 2003; Van Box-
tel et al., 2010a; Cohen and Dennett, 2011). I will focus here on the
neural mechanisms subserving attention and consciousness. The
rationale is quite simple: if attention and consciousness function-
ally and conceptually overlap, they should share common neural
mechanisms. Conversely, if attention and consciousness turn out
to rely on independent neural mechanisms, then they probably
reﬂect distinct concepts and functions. Let us consider an anal-
ogy: looking at a contemporary painting can be a disconcerting
experience. To see better, both a powerful lamp and the explana-
tions of an art critic can be extremely useful. Themeans employed
to see better – speech and light – fundamentally differ, and should
therefore not be confused. Note that this analogy does not imply
that speech and light are analogous to awareness and attention,
but rather that seeing better, in other words the end-product of
both attention and awareness, can be achieved by different means.
I will ﬁrst present how the links between attention and con-
sciousness can be conceived at the neural level, and then review
and discuss three points of apparent convergence between the
neural mechanisms involved in attention and consciousness. The
ﬁrst one is sensory ampliﬁcation: for a stimulus to reach aware-
ness, enough sensory activationmust be present. Because attention
selectively ampliﬁes sensory inputs, it could foster consciousness.
Second, attention is controlled by activity in the fronto-parietal
network, that has been repeatedly found to correlate with con-
sciousness reports. Last, oscillatory neural synchrony has been
proposed to play a role in both attention and consciousness. I
will then review those imaging experiments that simultaneously
manipulated attention and measured consciousness.
HOW THE LINK BETWEEN ATTENTION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS CAN BE CONCEIVED
Figure 1 attempts at schematically formalizing how the links
between attention and awareness can be conceived. It is clearly
FIGURE 1 | How attention and consciousness could be related.Three
options are presented, that all depend on attention-related activities, noted
as A, consciousness-related activity, noted as C, and decisional process,
noted as D, until the subject ﬁnally produces his or her behavioral report on
the presence or absence of a stimulus. Top, the gateway hypothesis. In this
classical view (Dehaene et al., 2006), attention facilitates consciousness,
and could even be considered as necessary for consciousness to emerge.
Middle, the reverse dependence hypothesis. Alternatively, whether a
stimulus has been detected or not at the neural level could trigger different
attentional mechanisms. Although some behavioral data could be in line
with this possibility (Hsu et al., 2011), it is not directly supported by neural
data so far. Bottom, the cumulative inﬂuence hypothesis. In this view, that
could account for a number of imaging results, attention, and
consciousness would be implemented by distinct neural mechanisms, but
would both inﬂuence, although with different weights, the ﬁnal report of
the subject on the presence or absence of a stimulus. This hypothesis
postulates the existence of a decision variable that would accumulate
mainly consciousness-related neural activity, but also, to a lesser extent,
attention-related neural activity. Behavioral reports based on this decision
variable could therefore show an interaction between attention and
consciousness, whereas neural variables could be related solely to
attention and consciousness.
inspired by Lamme’s inﬂuential paper (Lamme, 2003), but intro-
duces new options and, importantly, an additional component:
decision. Indeed, consciousness is experimentally studied mainly
by sorting out behavioral or neural measures according to sub-
jects’ report, for instance depending on whether the subject saw
a face or vase, a grating, or a blank screen. Reporting one’s per-
ceptual state implies deciding which option should be chosen.
It is therefore important to incorporate the decisional step into
models of consciousness. Decisional processes have been so far
analyzed in the perceptual decision-making model (Smith and
Ratcliff, 2004), without any explicit reference to consciousness.
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In this model, a decision variable accumulates sensory evidence
until a response criteria is reached. Decision depends on the ini-
tial bias, i.e., whether the response criterion is a priori lower for
one option, and on the rate of accumulation of sensory evidence.
This model explains well reaction times distributions (Smith and
Ratcliff, 2004), and evidence for the existence of decision variable
in areas downstream to sensory regions has been obtained both in
monkeys (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) and humans (Heekeren et al.,
2008).
The ﬁrst option is that attention is a prerequisite for aware-
ness: those stimuli that are voluntarily attended to, or that are
salient enough to attract attention, can reach consciousness and
be reported. I will call this possibility the gateway model. For
the sake of completeness, one should also consider the possi-
bility that attention depends on consciousness. In other words,
the type of attentional processes mobilized in a given task could
depend on whether the subject is aware of the stimulus (“reverse
dependence”). Last, attention and consciousness could be initially
independent, but combined at a later, decisional stage leading to
the ﬁnal verbal report of the subject. I will call this last option
the cumulative inﬂuence model. Note that in all models, when
either the neuralmechanisms involved in attention and conscious-
ness are affected, the subjective report of the subject is modiﬁed.
Measuring directly the neural mechanisms related to attention
and consciousness may therefore prove useful to discriminate
between the three hypothesis. In an experiment in which attention
is manipulated and consciousness measured, if all observed neural
correlates of consciousness depend on attentional manipulation,
then the gateway model is likely to be the correct one. Finding
distinct correlates of attention depending on whether the subject
reported the stimulus or not would favor the reverse dependence
model. Last, if some neural correlates of consciousness are inde-
pendent fromattention and someneural correlates of attention are
independent from consciousness, then the cumulative inﬂuence
view is more likely.
NEURAL AMPLIFICATION IN ATTENTION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
The role of attention is to prioritize incoming sensory processing
to enable optimized behavioral responses given the task at hand.
The main neural mechanisms associated to the attentional modu-
lation of sensory processing are target ampliﬁcation and distractor
suppression. By combining these twomechanisms, sensory regions
would be able to selectively amplify target-related neural signals
to facilitate the transmission of target-related information further
along the information processing chain (Desimone and Duncan,
1995). A huge amount of experimental evidence for target ampli-
ﬁcation in sensory regions has been obtained in the last 30 years
in monkeys and humans (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Kastner
andUngerleider, 2000;Corbetta and Shulman,2002; Reynolds and
Chelazzi, 2004; Raz and Buhle, 2006). Target enhancement can be
observed in all correlates of neural activity, fromﬁring rates (Treue,
2003; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Bisley and Goldberg, 2010) to
gamma-bandoscillatory synchrony (Gruber et al., 1999; Fries et al.,
2001; Tallon-Baudry et al., 2005; Siegel et al., 2008), event-related
potentials (Hillyard and Anllovento, 1998; Luck et al., 2000), and
BOLD signal (Corbetta et al., 1990; Kastner et al., 1998). Evidence
for distractor suppression has also been obtained, by showing that
when two stimuli are presented in the receptive ﬁeld of the neu-
ron, the overall response of this neuron is similar to the response to
the target presented alone (Moran and Desimone, 1985; Chelazzi
et al., 1993; Reynolds et al., 1999). Activemechanisms of distractor
suppression have also been described in humans (Luck et al., 1997;
Vanduffel et al., 2000; Worden et al., 2000; Hopf et al., 2006; Thut
et al., 2006; Andersen andMuller, 2010). Those results lend strong
support to the biased competition model of attention (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995) as well as to the idea of priority maps (Itti and
Koch, 2001).
Many inﬂuential theories of consciousness posit that selec-
tive neural ampliﬁcation plays a key role for an information to
reach awareness. This assumption is explicit in the global work-
space model (Baars, 1997; Dehaene et al., 1998), the multiple draft
theory (Dennett, 1991), but is also present in the dynamic core
hypothesis (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Edelman, 2003). Com-
petition between different inputs is central to all those models:
the neural information that has been most ampliﬁed is the win-
ner, the one that reaches consciousness (Crick and Koch, 2003).
In this view, a neural correlate of consciousness is by deﬁnition
an activity that is larger in response to consciously seen stim-
uli than to unseen stimuli. Experimentally, neural ampliﬁcation
is at the heart of most experimental results on consciousness: in
most cases, activity in sensory regions appear to be larger for con-
sciously seen stimuli (Tong et al., 1998; Polonsky et al., 2000; Rees
et al., 2000; Dehaene et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Ress and
Heeger, 2003;Haynes et al., 2005;Tse et al., 2005;Hesselmann et al.,
2011; Sergent et al., 2011). Note however that although conscious-
ness has been associated most often with response ampliﬁcation,
response attenuation has also been described in humans (Melloni
et al., 2011). In monkey area V4 in a binocular rivalry paradigm,
single neuron activity can either increase or decrease before the
animal reports perceiving the cell’s preferred orientation (Leopold
and Logothetis, 1996), suggesting that both response enhancement
and response suppression can be informative. Despite those two
results, response ampliﬁcation is most often considered to play a
crucial role in consciousness. It could be tempting to infer that
enhanced sensory responses to seen stimuli are due to a mecha-
nism of neural ampliﬁcation akin to the one used by attention.
This is all the more true that sensory activities correlating with
consciousness have been observed between 100 and 200ms using
stimuli at detection threshold (Pins and Ffytche, 2003) or a mod-
iﬁed rivalry paradigm (Roeber et al., 2008), a latency range that is
typically affected by attention (Luck et al., 2000).
To what extent does the parallelism between sensory responses
ampliﬁed by attention and sensory responses reaching conscious-
ness hold true? Behaviorally, spatial attention is considered to
facilitate detection by enhancing perceived contrast (Carrasco,
2011), although there is some ongoing controversies (Solomon,
2004; Schneider and Komlos, 2008). This proposal seems to be in
line with the enhanced responses to attended stimuli in visual
cortices, but this convergence between behavioral studies and
physiological recordings may be only superﬁcial. Indeed, increas-
ing the physical contrast of the stimulus induces a robust latency
shift of the neural sensory response, with high-contrast grating
peaking 30–40ms earlier in monkey area V1 (Gawne et al., 1996).
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Surprisingly, there is no available evidence that attended stim-
uli, that are supposed to be neurally encoded with an enhanced
contrast leading to detection, give rise to faster responses than
unattended stimuli. In humans, the best-studied attentional mod-
ulation (Hillyard and Anllovento, 1998; Luck et al., 2000) is the
amplitude enhancement by spatial attention of the so-called P1,
a wave of activity that occurs around 100ms in early extra-striate
areas (Di Russo et al., 2002). P1 amplitude enhancement by spa-
tial attention is not accompanied by a shortening of its latency.
Magneto-encephalographic data, that have a better spatial resolu-
tion than EEG data, revealed a spatially ﬁne-grained attentional
suppression/enhancement of the P1 amplitude but nevertheless
failed to reveal a shortening of latency by spatial attention (Hopf
et al., 2006). The only report of a P1 latency shortening has been
obtained with eye-gaze cues (Schuller and Rossion, 2001, 2004).
Spatial attention could potentially induce latency shifts coupled
with amplitude increases at longer latencies only, after 200ms
(Noguchi et al., 2007). A direct comparison of the effects of con-
trast and of spatial attention has been performed in monkey area
V4 (Lee et al., 2007). Both attention and contrast enhancement
affected themagnitude of single cell responses. However, attention
did not change the response latency, while contrast did. It has even
been recently suggested that visual attention and stimulus contrast
rely on separable neural codes in monkey area V1 (Pooresmaeili
et al., 2010). To conclude, the neural mechanisms used by atten-
tion are not directly equivalent to contrast enhancement: there
may be different ways of coding saliency at the neural level. This
conclusion does not in itself allow to distinguish between the three
hypothesis described in Figure 1, but it leaves open the possibility
that the same ﬁnal behavioral output, here enhanced detection,
may be achieved by distinct neural mechanisms.
INVOLVEMENT OF THE FRONTO-PARIETAL NETWORK IN
ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Attention operates in sensory regions, but the top-down control of
voluntary or goal-directed attention largely relies on parietal and
frontal cortices in humans (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Bressler
et al., 2008; Corbetta et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 2010) andmon-
keys (Bisley and Goldberg, 2003; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004;
Buschman andMiller, 2007; Ekstrom et al., 2008). In parallel, pari-
etal and frontal correlates of awareness have been often reported
(Rees et al., 2002). Activity in those regions is abnormal in altered
states of consciousness, such as in vegetative patients (Laureys,
2005) or during generalized epileptic seizures accompanied by a
loss of consciousness (Blumenfeld et al., 2003). Frontal regions are
also the ﬁrst areas to deactivatewhen falling asleep and the last ones
to reactivate after awakening (Hobson and Pace-Schott, 2002).
Imaging studies of consciousness repeatedly underlined the role
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Sahraie et al., 1997; Lumer
et al., 1998; Beck et al., 2001; Lau and Passingham, 2006), parietal
regions (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Lumer et al., 1998; Beck et al.,
2001, 2006; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Carmel et al., 2006; Hessel-
mann et al., 2011), the inferior frontal cortex (Lumer et al., 1998;
Dehaene et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Sergent et al., 2005;
Carmel et al., 2006;Hesselmann et al., 2011), as well as the anterior
cingulate cortex (Dehaene et al., 2001; Sergent et al., 2005; Carmel
et al., 2006). In monkeys, the perceived direction of an ambiguous
motion correlates with activity in the parietal region LIP (Williams
et al., 2003), and correlates of detection of somatosensory stimuli
at threshold are best observed in the medial premotor cortex (De
Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006).
All the areas listed above as correlates of consciousness have
also been associated with attention and control. The dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate are well known to
be involved in control and performance monitoring (Macdonald
et al., 2000). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is also an important
structure for the maintenance of sensory information in mem-
ory (Constantinidis et al., 2001; Curtis and D’esposito, 2003),
and could potentially participate to the attentional selection of
information (Lebedev et al., 2004; Buschman and Miller, 2007).
The posterior parietal cortex/anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS)
region is a key structure of the dorsal attentional network, while
the inferior frontal region belongs to the ventral attentional net-
work (Corbetta et al., 2008). Ameta-analysis of imaging studies on
attention, working memory, episodic retrieval, and consciousness
(Naghavi and Nyberg, 2005) reveals a large overlap in the poste-
rior parietal cortex, that belongs to the dorsal attentional network,
and in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated to decision-
making. From this convergence one could be tempted to deduce
the existence of a central executive based on the posterior parietal
cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, that would be necessary
for all high-level functions. This central executive could consti-
tute a core component of consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006;
Del Cul et al., 2009). Alternatively, fronto-parietal activations in
some studies could be due to uncontrolled ﬂuctuations of atten-
tion and/or memory affecting subjects’ reports. To what extent do
fronto-parietal activations correlate with consciousness per se?
First, it should be noted that not all experiments searching for
the neural correlates of consciousness found a signiﬁcant involve-
ment of frontal or parietal regions (Tong et al., 1998; Tse et al.,
2005). Potentially, the fronto-parietal activations observed in some
consciousness studies could reﬂect a consequence of conscious-
ness, rather than a cause. A stimulus that is consciously perceived
can be cognitively manipulated, and therefore activate fronto-
parietal regions. In line with this idea, it has been recently shown
that activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, typically
associated with transitions between different conscious contents,
would be a consequence of perceived transitions rather than a
cause (Knapen et al., 2011). However, a high-level of activity in
the dorsal attentional network before stimulus onset can, depend-
ing on the experiment, either foster (Boly et al., 2007) or impair
(Sadaghiani et al., 2009) the detection of stimuli at threshold. This
latter ﬁnding can be understood in the framework of the cumu-
lative inﬂuence hypothesis: attention-related activity can either
positively participate, or actively inhibit, the ﬁnal decision about
the presence or absence of a stimulus.
Second, at least some of the fronto-parietal regions that have
been associated with consciousness can be activated uncon-
sciously. Activity in the anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal,
and parietal cortices is modulated by events that are not con-
sciously perceived (Berns et al., 1997). The IPS reacts to sub-
liminally presented numbers (Naccache and Dehaene, 2001). The
anterior cingulate cortex is activated by errors subjects were aware
of as well as by those they were not aware of making (Hester
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et al., 2005), and medial prefrontal – occipital coupling is present
in conscious as well as unconscious errors (Cohen et al., 2009).
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Lau and Passingham, 2007)
and areas of the medial frontal cortex involved in the control of
voluntary action (Sumner et al., 2007) participate to unconscious
and involuntary control, and non-consciously triggered inhibitory
control is associated with frontal brain potentials (Van Gaal et al.,
2008).
Third, none of the studies listed above tried to disentangle the
relative contributions of attention, control, memory, and con-
sciousness to fronto-parietal activations. For instance, since the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex participates to the maintenance of
information in short-term memory, it could appear activated in
many consciousness studies: to report the presence of a stimu-
lus, information about this stimulus has to be kept in memory
until the production of the behavioral response. Besides, the same
paradigm has sometimes been used to probe either attention or
consciousness, thereby implying that the same neural structures
appear, by deﬁnition, as a correlate of both attention and con-
sciousness. For instance, the attentional blink paradigm has been
used to identify neural correlates of consciousness (Sergent et al.,
2005; Kranczioch et al., 2007) or to probe the temporal limitations
of attention (Husain et al., 1997; Gross et al., 2004). As a result,
the parietal involvement common to all these studies could refer
to either attention or consciousness.
In the light of those three lines of arguments, the fronto-parietal
network contribution to consciousness should be re-evaluated:
fronto-parietal activations appear neither necessary nor sufﬁcient
for consciousness, and/or could reﬂect other functions such as
attention and memory. However it should be noted that the term
“fronto-parietal” is often used to refer to a vast ensemble of loosely
deﬁned regions, supporting “high-level” functions in general. It
may be necessary to be muchmore speciﬁc. For instance, different
subregions of the right superior parietal lobule appear to play dis-
tinct roles on perceptual ﬂuctuations in binocular rivalry (Kanai
et al., 2011). Applying TMS stimulation over right parietal regions
can lead to a shortening (Carmel et al., 2010) or a lengthening
(Kanai et al., 2010; Zaretskaya et al., 2010) of dominance dura-
tions in binocular rivalry, depending on whether TMS stimulation
is applied online or ofﬂine whether the stimulated sites are more
anterior or posterior. Last, to make the story even more complex,
the frontal lobes have been repeatedly associated with a hierar-
chical organization of cognitive control (Koechlin et al., 2003;
Botvinick, 2008; Badre and D’esposito, 2009), but those models
are essentially mute on consciousness: so far, understanding the
frontal lobe functions did not require to take consciousness into
account.
OSCILLATORY SYNCHRONY
There is a strong consensus in the literature that consciousness is a
distributed process, involving the coordination of neural activ-
ity across a number of cortical regions. Oscillatory synchrony
is considered as a neural mechanism that could ﬂexibly coordi-
nate activity within and between neural populations, in a task-
dependent manner (Singer and Gray, 1995). Schematically, two
neural groups, that encode distinct aspects of the stimulus for
instance in their rate code, may temporarily signal to each other
that they are working on related pieces of information by synchro-
nizing their activity at the population level. Oscillatory synchrony
was therefore quickly identiﬁed as a potential neural mechanism
involved in the emergence of consciousness (Engel and Singer,
2001).
Experimentally, both gamma (∼30–90Hz) and beta (∼15–
30Hz) bands oscillatory synchrony have been linked to visual
consciousness. In humans, stimuli at threshold elicit gamma-band
(30–100Hz) oscillations in posterior regions only when they are
consciously perceived (Schurger et al., 2008; Wyart and Tallon-
Baudry, 2008, 2009; Luo et al., 2009), and independently from
objective performance (Schurger et al., 2006). In masking par-
adigms, word visibility is associated with enhanced long-range
synchronization in the gamma (Melloni et al., 2007) or beta
(Gaillard et al., 2009) range. In conditions of bistable perception,
perceptual transitions are preceded and accompanied by increased
gamma-band oscillatory synchrony (Doesburg et al., 2005) and by
a modulation of beta-range oscillatory synchrony in a network
comprising the frontal eye ﬁelds, posterior parietal cortices, lateral
occipital regions, and occipital pole (Hipp et al., 2011). Failure to
report the second target in the attentional blink paradigm corre-
lates with decreased fronto-parietal beta synchrony (Gross et al.,
2004). In monkeys, target visibility manipulated by ﬂash sup-
pression is characterized by increased gamma-band oscillations
in area V4 and reduced alpha (8–12Hz) and beta suppressions in
areas V1, V2, and V4, while spiking activity is almost unchanged
(Wilke et al., 2006). The link between gamma and beta-band oscil-
latory synchrony and consciousness is of course not conﬁned
to the visual modality. For instance, nociceptive somatosensory
stimuli around pain threshold elicit gamma-band oscillations in
primary somatosensory cortex whose amplitude is tightly related
to subjective pain ratings (Gross et al., 2007).
In parallel to this role in establishing the neural cooperativity
thought to be necessary for consciousness to emerge, oscillatory
synchrony could also be used to set up a selective ﬁlter and there-
fore be a core component of attentional processes (Womelsdorf
and Fries, 2007). Neurons are highly sensitive to the temporal
structure of incoming inputs. If a neuron receives inputs within
a brief time window, it is much more likely to ﬁre in response
to those inputs and transmit information further downstream
than if the inputs are dispersed in time. Because of its temporal
structure, oscillatory synchrony imposes windows of increased or
decreased excitability (Steriade et al., 1993; Buzsaki and Draguhn,
2004) that can facilitate the transfer of information between two
neural populations (Fries, 2005). Let us consider two structures, A
and B, that compete for transmitting information to a target area
T further along the processing chain. If A and T are synchronized
but not B and T, then A will win the competition over B to get
its information transmitted to T. This represents an elegant way
of implementing an attentional ﬁlter, that can be used by both
bottom-up and top-down attention. There is clear experimental
evidence that selective attention enhances gamma-band oscilla-
tory synchrony, in monkey area V4 (Fries et al., 2001), in human
scalp EEG (Tallon-Baudry et al., 1997;Gruber et al., 1999), orMEG
(Bauer et al., 2006; Vidal et al., 2006) data, as well as in intracra-
nial recordings (Tallon-Baudry et al., 2005; Engell and Mccarthy,
2010). Importantly, the strength of gamma-band synchronization
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in monkey area V4 predicts behavioral response times (Womels-
dorf et al., 2006). There is also growing evidence that oscillatory
synchrony plays an important role in the control of top-down
attention. Indeed, during attentional deployment, oscillatory syn-
chrony increases between sensory regions and frontal and parietal
regions, both in humans (Doesburg et al., 2008; Siegel et al., 2008)
andmonkeys (Buschman andMiller, 2007;Gregoriou et al., 2009).
The fact that the same neural mechanism is involved in both
attention and consciousness could suggest that the two functions
are intrinsically linked. Alternatively, oscillatory synchrony could
be seen as a population code, that can be used by any cognitive
function –much as spikes constitute the core signalingmechanism
at the single neuron level. For instance, gamma-band oscillatory
synchrony is known to be involved not only in attention and
consciousness, but also in feature binding, memory, and learn-
ing (Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand, 1999; Jensen et al., 2007; Fries,
2009; Tallon-Baudry, 2009). It recently appeared that when dis-
tinct cognitive processes are simultaneously active, gamma-band
oscillations are elicited in distinct, narrow frequency bands (Vidal
et al., 2006; Schurger et al., 2008; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008;
Chaumon et al., 2009). Oscillatory synchrony is now considered
as an essential population code that takes advantage of neurons
ﬁne temporal tuning, not a speciﬁc marker of a given cognitive
function (Jensen et al., 2007; Fries, 2009; Tallon-Baudry, 2009).
PROBING ATTENTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
SIMULTANEOUSLY AT THE NEURAL LEVEL
As underlined above, the apparent convergence between the neural
correlates of attention and awareness is mainly based on experi-
ments that either manipulated attention or measured conscious-
ness. However, the two concepts often overlap in those exper-
iments – for instance, is attention or consciousness probed in
the attentional blink paradigm? To address more thoroughly the
issue of the link between attention and consciousness, some
studies attempted at manipulating attention while measuring
consciousness.
Several EEG studies convincingly demonstrated that atten-
tional mechanisms can be triggered by attentional cues that do
not reach consciousness. The N2pc is a lateralized evoked compo-
nent that reﬂects the orienting of spatial attention. It is observed
between 200 and 300ms after stimulus onset, over the hemisphere
contralateral to the attended location. Targets rendered invisible by
object-substitutionmasking elicit anN2pc, therebydemonstrating
that attention can be attracted by stimuli that cannot be accurately
reported (Woodman and Luck, 2003). In line with this idea, source
modeling of EEGdata reveals that seen andunseen attentional cues
are initially processed in the same manner along the dorsal stream
(Babiloni et al., 2006). Attention can alsomodulate the neural pro-
cessing of stimuli that do not reach consciousness, from 200ms
after stimulus onset for spatial attention (Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2007) to 400–600ms for temporal attention (Kiefer and Brendel,
2006). Conversely, early differences between seen andunseen stim-
ulus,before 200ms, can be independent from the attentional status
of the stimulus (Koivisto et al., 2006; Boehler et al., 2008; Koivisto
and Revonsuo, 2008). Altogether, these results suggest that atten-
tion and consciousness can operate via a least partly independent
mechanisms.
The possibility that spatial attention and visual awareness rely
on at least partly independentmechanismswas directly tested in an
experiment comparing neural responses to stimuli that were phys-
ically strictly identical, but that could be consciously perceived
or not and attended or not, on a trial-by-trial basis (Wyart and
Tallon-Baudry, 2008). In this experiment, subjects oriented their
attention according to a central cue in a typical Posner paradigm,
toward faint gratings, at threshold for awareness. The factor-
ial analysis of the magneto-encephalographic data revealed the
existence of high-frequency gamma-band oscillations that were
larger for attended stimuli, either seen or unseen, and the exis-
tence of low-frequency gamma-band oscillations that were larger
for seen stimuli, either attended or unattended. The attention-
independent correlate of awareness was localized in the posterior
lateral occipital cortex (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009). The dou-
ble dissociation observed in this experiment between the neural
correlates of attention and consciousness is only compatible with
the cumulative inﬂuence model in Figure 1. Interestingly in this
experiment, although a neural correlate of visual consciousness
independent from attentionwas identiﬁed, subjective reports were
affected by spatial attention: subjects weremore likely to detect the
stimulus when it appeared at the attended location. A parametric
analysis at the single-trial level was compatible with the existence
of a decisional stage integrating both the consciousness-related
and attention-related activity into the ﬁnal subjective report. In
other words, the results of this experiment are strongly in favor
of the cumulative inﬂuence model. This model would also explain
why late neural correlates of stimulus visibility (Fernandez-Duque
et al., 2003; Sergent et al., 2005; Del Cul et al., 2007; Lamy et al.,
2009; Genetti et al., 2010), close to the subject behavioral report,
can be inﬂuenced by parameters such as attention (Koivisto et al.,
2009) or conﬁdence in one’s decision (Eimer and Mazza, 2005):
attention and conﬁdence evaluation could enter the ﬁnal deci-
sional process about whether the stimulus has been experienced
or not, providing additional sources of neural evidence to ﬁnally
report the stimulus as seen or unseen.
There is also ample evidence that the state of the nervous system
before stimulus onset can deeply inﬂuence the conscious report of
the subject (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2004; Palva et al., 2005;
Pourtois et al., 2006; Boly et al., 2007; Hanslmayr et al., 2007; Hes-
selmann et al., 2008b;Monto et al., 2008;VanDijk et al., 2008; Britz
et al., 2009; Busch et al., 2009; Mathewson et al., 2009; Sadaghiani
et al., 2009). Spontaneousmodiﬁcations of neural activity are often
attributed to ﬂuctuations in vigilance (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al.,
2004; Boly et al., 2007), gain modulation, or attention (Hanslmayr
et al., 2007; Van Dijk et al., 2008), although those factors are not
explicitly controlled.
According to this view, a sensory area could be in a state of high
neural excitability, corresponding to a state of higher vigilance or
attention, and would therefore generate a larger response when
the stimulus occurs.While this explanationmay hold true in some
cases, it is not the only way prestimulus activity in sensory areas
can inﬂuence the seen or unseen fate of a stimulus (Hesselmann
et al., 2008a;Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009). Indeed, a high base-
line level of activity inﬂuencing the subject’s behavioral report is
not necessarily followed by a large response to the stimulus. The
inﬂuence of baseline ﬂuctuations thus cannot be explained only by
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an enhanced excitability leading to stronger responses to incom-
ing stimuli. Rather, it seems that prestimulus activity in sensory
regions could directly bias the decision process, by shifting the
initial level of the decision variable toward one option. In other
words, the sensory cortex of a subject could be biased toward judg-
ing that a stimulus is present (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2009), or
that the stimulus content is vase or a face (Hesselmann et al.,
2008a), independently from the strength of the sensory response
to the stimulus. These results show that decision-making mat-
ters in consciousness studies, and that the decision process does
not fully map onto parieto-frontal regions: decisional determi-
nants can be implemented in sensory regions as well, even before
stimulus onset.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, attention does operate in sensory regions, but
neural ampliﬁcation by attention appears functionally distinct
from the neural ampliﬁcation related to consciousness: attention
does not shorten response latencies, as more contrasted objects
would (Lee et al., 2007), attention-related and consciousness-
related neural activities in retinotopic areas can be dissociated
(Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008). There is growing evidence that
events that do not reach consciousness nevertheless activate pari-
etal and frontal regions, suggesting that they are not sufﬁcient
for consciousness to emerge. Because frontal regions are not
always activated, one can even wonder whether they are neces-
sary. An alternative possibility is that they reﬂect a consequence
of consciousness, rather than a cause (Knapen et al., 2011). Last,
oscillatory synchrony is not associated exclusively with a single
process, be it feature binding, memory and learning, attention,
or consciousness, but should rather be considered as a generic
mechanism governing neural interactions.
The fact that there can be an independence of the sensory
correlates of attention and of consciousness, together with late
correlates of visibility modulated by attention and behavioral
interactions between attention and consciousness, argues in favor
of the cumulative inﬂuence: consciousness-related and attention-
related neural activities would be integrated in a single decision
variable. This decision variablewould accumulate not only sensory
evidence, as in the classical perceptual decision-making frame-
work (Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Gold and Shadlen, 2007;Heekeren
et al., 2008), but more processed neural information related to
either consciousness or attention. Whether and how such a vari-
able is implemented remains to be determined experimentally.
In any case, one should keep in mind a number of limitations
of this model. First, the visual representation of the cumula-
tive inﬂuence model as presented in Figure 1, does not capture
its complexity. For instance, one could assume that a decisional
process necessarily takes place in anterior regions, and at a late
time point along the processing chain. However, a decisional bias
can be implemented in sensory regions and be already present
before stimulus onset (Hesselmann et al., 2008a;Wyart andTallon-
Baudry, 2009). Second, the arguments developed in this paper
are based on experimental results obtained in fMRI as well as
MEG–EEG studies. One should keep in mind that the relation-
ship between the BOLD signal and electrophysiological data is
not well established yet (Logothetis, 2003), and that the differ-
ent measures sometimes provide inconsistent results (Buracas and
Boynton, 2007). Third, there are many different types of atten-
tion – space-based or feature-based attention, divided or selective
attention, top-down and stimulus-driven attention, endogenous
or exogenous spatial attention. There is already good evidence
that different forms of attention rely on different networks (Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002; Chica et al., 2011a) or different forms of
neural communication (Buschman andMiller, 2007). Because the
different types of attention are implemented differently, it is likely
that they interact differently with awareness (Chica et al., 2011b;
Hsu et al., 2011).
Even if the cumulative inﬂuence hypothesis has its limitations,
it is so far the model that ﬁts best with experimental data. Inter-
estingly this model points toward the existence of a sensory neural
activity related to consciousness, uncontaminated by other cogni-
tive processes such as attention. Such an activity could potentially
be very close to the immediate subjective experience of the sub-
ject. This is reminiscent of the idea of phenomenal awareness,
that could be distinct from cognitive access (Block, 2007). Exper-
imentally, the only possibility to study consciousness is to rely
on the subject’s ﬁnal subjective report, that relies on a complex
decisional process. It is therefore all the more interesting that
neural data sorted according to this integrated subjective report
should point toward the existence of an activity in upper visual
areas uncontaminated by attention (Wyart and Tallon-Baudry,
2008) that could potentially be directly related with phenomenal
consciousness (Hesselmann et al., 2011). It therefore seems that
consciousness can be distinguished from accompanying cognitive
functions at the neural level. It still remains to be determined what
is the advantage, from a functional or evolutionary perspective, of
having two ampliﬁcation systems, one related to consciousness
and the other to attention, and to what extent the nature of the
decisional process is modiﬁed by consciousness-related entries.
In particular, is it because of consciousness-related inputs that a
capacity-limited cognitive bottleneck appears? Answering those
questions would provide us with important clues about the still
elusive functional role of consciousness.
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